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THE FLORIDA REAL ESTATE BROKER AND HIS COMMISSIONS
It has become apparent in the past several years that the real estate
business has assumed a predominant position in Florida's economic pattern.'
One of its unavoidable by-products has been the ever increasing amount of
litigation concerning brokerage fees. Tn spite of the numerous appellate cases
in Florida on this topic, there still remains a large field of uncertainty. Strong
public reaction 2 to the recent case of Pembroke v. Cauditl, illustrates the truth
of this proposition. The answers to the problems ensuing from the subject
matter can not be determined by reference to our statutory law. There is, and
has been, no legislation in Florida concerning brokerage commissions other
than from the licensing aspect.
4
This comment is an attempt to reexamine and organize past local decisions,
so as to present a broad introductory survey of the present status of brokerage
law. There has been no attempt made to cover the innumerable facets of the
topic, but the comment is limited to the more general and interesting situations.
I
BROKERAGE CONTRACT
A broker's right to remuneration for his services must be predicated
on contractual relations existing between himself and his principal.' If he
is unable to prove an express promise to pay for his services, he is permitted
to show facts from which the law will imply a promise.6 The necessary result
is that the terms of the contract are left to conjecture and require judicial
construction and fact finding. This situation has been adequately handled in
other jurisdictions by statutory control 7 A common example is that of Texas:
"No action shall be brought in any court in this state for the recovery of any
commission for the sale or purchase of real estate unless the promise or agree-
ment upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum thereof,
shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or by some
person by him thereto lawfully authorized." 8 In effect, all brokerage contracts
are thus within the Statute of Frauds, even though title to realty is not actually
1. WOLFF, MIAMI-EcoNoMic PATTERN OF A RESORT AREA (1945).
2. Undated open letter issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission, Orlando,
Florida, to all real estate brokers.
3. 37 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1948); Stephenson, Quartery Synopsis, 3 MIAMI L. Q. 290
(1949).
4. FLA. STAT. c. 475 (1941).
5. Varn v. Pelot, 55 Fla. 357, 45 So. 1015 (1908) ; Note, 15 WAsln. L. REv. 124 (1940)
(there must be a fiduciary relationship between the parties before any liability is incurred).
6. Varn v. Pelot, supra.
7. N. J. REV. STAT., tit. 25, c. 1, § 9 (1937) ; NEB. COMP. STAT., c. 36, Art. 107 (1929)
WIs. STAT., c. 240, § 10 (1949) ; CAL. Civ. CODE, § 1624, p. 5 (1941).
8. TEX. STAT., C. 6573a, § 22 (Vernon, 1939).
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involved. Although the statute is mandatory 9 and recovery is not allowed
under quantum reruit,10 judicial interpretation has successfully avoided some
of the harshness of the statute. A broker whose efforts have resulted in a sale
on terms satisfactory to the vendor is not to be deprived of his commission
where, as a result of bargaining between vendor and vendee, vendor agrees
to accept a price less or on terms different than those stated in the written
contract of employment." It could be argued that the practical application of
such a statute in Florida might be unwise; however, weighed against the
considerations of less litigation, less opportunity for fraud, the contention of
inconvenience does not seem to be a valid one.
In keeping with general contract law the broker must not be a volunteer,
and he is not entitled to compensation even though a purchaser is found
through information furnished by him. 12
The nature of the broker's rights arising from the contract of empuloyment
are dependent upon the terms of the contract itself. These employment con-
tracts have been generally broken down into the classification of "'open or
general listings," "exclusive agency" and "exclusive right to sell." A general
listing is an offer that does not ripen into a contract until it is accepted by
fulfillment of its terms, i.e., a unilateral contract.' 3 An exclusive agency or
right to sell is generally construed as a presently binding contract of employ-
ment, i.e., a bilateral contract.' 4 The vendor-principal's liability under an
exclusive agency is different from that under an exclusive right to sell.'5 If the
broker has an exclusive right to sell, the owner is liable for danmages even
though he himself sells the property,' 6 but the vendor incurs no such liability
under a contract of exclusive agency.' In Florida an "exclusive sale" has been
strictly construed to mean an exclusive agency.' In both situations, i.e.,
whether an exclusive agency or exclusive right to sell, where someone other
than the vendor sells the property, the broker is entitled to damages. U
9. Cougbran v. Smith, 167 S. W.2d 815 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1942).
10. Walker v. Keeling, 160 S. W.2d 310 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1945).
11. Volkmann v. Wortham, 189 S. W.2d 776 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1945).
12. Howell v. Blackburn, 100 Fla. 114, 129 So. 341 (1930); City Builder's Finance
Co. v. Stahl, 90 Fla. 357, 106 So. 77 (1925).
13. Haggart v. King, 107 Kan. 75, 190 Pac. 763 (1920); Saunders v. Hackley &
Hume Co., 275 Mo. 41, 208 S. W. 67 (1918); cf. Stoy v. Berg, 96 Fla. 858, 119 So. 139(1928) (qualified contract has the same legal effect as an open listing).
14. South Florida Farms Co. v. Stevenson, 84 Fla. 235, 93 So. 247 (1922).
15. See Note, 64 A.L.R. 395 (1929).
16. Harris v. McPherson, 97 Conn. 164, 115 Atd. 723 (1922); Falkenburg v. Giaco-
mazzi, 53 Cal. App. 449, 200 Pac. 372 (1921) ; Dain v. Loeffler, 256 Pa. 319, 100 Ati. 888(1917).
17. See note 14 sup, ra.
18. Ibid.
19. Niemann v. Severson, 246 Wis. 636, 18 N. W.2d 338 (1945) ; Fleming v. Dolfin,




The broker's right to a conmmission is conditioned upon the fulfillment of
his duties as set forth in the brokerage contract. The exclusive agreement usual-
ly is phrased so as to call for the procuIrement of a purchaser or the effecting of
a sale. The oft-cited case of H 'igyins -,. It/*ilswi 2'1 asserts that under a contract
to procure a purchaser, the broker need only find the purchaser and introduce
him to the vendor; in the case of a contract to effect a sale, the broker must com-
pletely negotiate the sale on the terms authorized by his principal, leaving noth-
ing for the principal to do but execute the papers necessary to transfer title.- '
The minimum requirements to effect a sale are that the broker must
either procure a binding contract of purchase within the terms authorized ;22
secure purchase money and transfer title when so empowered ;23 or, the prin-
cipal must relieve the broker of the burden of securing execution of a written
contract. 24 Mere procurement of one who takes an option is not sufficient per-
formance, 25 nor is the payment less than the amount stipulated in the contract
since such payment is presumed to be the mere holding of an option contract
and not a sale.2 0 A verbal agreement accompanied by payment of earnest money
is inadequate. Hence, the basic requirement for effecting a sale is that there be
a contract enforceable by the principal.2 7
When the contract of employment calls for the procurement of a pur-
chaser, the broker must either present to the principal a customer who is ready,
willing and able to buy on the terms prescribed by the contract, or he may go
further and take from the purchaser a binding contract of purchase. 25 This
leads to the further inquiry as to when a puirchaser is ready, willing and able.
Notwithstanding the comprehensive articles of niany writers 20 concerning
the terms "ready, willing and able." there seems to be no universal test. In
20. 55 Fla. 346, 45 So. 1011 (1908).
21. Weida v. Bacon, 102 Fla. 628, 138 So. 32 (1931) ; Livingston v. Malever, 103
Fla. 200, 137 So. 113 (1931); Malever v. Livingston, 95 Fla. 272, 116 So. 15 (1928);
Squires v. Kilgore, 92 Fla. 1001, 111 So. 113 (1926) ; E. A. Strout Farm Agency v.
Hollingsworth, 92 Fla. 673, 110 So. 267 (1926) ; Blue v. Staten, 84 Fla. 233, 93 So. 686(1922) ; Elliot v. Gamble, 77 Fla. 798, 82 So. 253 (1919) ; Varn v. Pelot, supra.
22. Wiggins v. Wilson, supra; Varn v. Pelot, su pra; Weida v. Bacon, supra: Loh-
meyer v. Williams, 37 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1948).
23. Sullivan v. Brown, 67 Fla. 133. 64 So. 455 (1914) ; Elliot v. Gamble, supra;
Dwiggins v. Roth, 37 So.2d 702 (Fla. 1948) (listing of property does not confer authority
to sell).
24. Livingston v. Malever, sitpra.
25. Acheson v. Smiths Inc.. 110 Fla. 240, 148 So. 576 (1933).
26. Williams v. Ray, 107 Fla. 327, 144 So. 679 (1932).
27. Malever v. Livingston. su pra,
28. Strano v. Carr & Carr, 97 Fla. 150, 119 So. 864 (1929) ; Carter v. Owens, 58 Fla.
204. 50 So. 641 (1909) ; Wiggins v. Wilson, supra.
29. Mechem, The Real Estate Broker and His Commissions, 6 Imr.. L. REv. 149 (1911);
Note. 16 ML;y, 1.. REV. 584 (1932).
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Perper v. Edell," the court arrived at this definition: "A broker producing a
purchaser financially able is not required to show that the purchaser is then
standing outside of the office door with all the cash in hand required to pay for
the property. If the purchaser is financially able to pay for the property within
the time stipulated it is sufficient. [Financially] 'able' means that the pro-
posed purchaser is able to command the necessary money to close the deal on
reasonable notice or within the time stipulated by the parties." 31
The connotation "willing" imputes agreement with the offer of the prin-
cipal and not a counter-offer.3 2 The broker has not earned his commission by
securing a person who is only willing to take an option.13, A satisfactory pur-
chaser is procured even though he may buy the property with an associate of
whom the broker has had no knowledge. 34 The burden of proof as to whether
a purchaser ready, willing and able has been secured, is upon the broker.
3 5
If there is a time limit set for performance by the broker, some jurisdic-
tions hold that procuring a purchaser ready, willing and able requires per-
formance strictly within the time allocated,36 and other states 7 apply the




It often happens that, although the broker may secure a prospective buyer,
the sale is finally concluded on terms other than those in the contract of em-
ployment and without the broker's further aid. Does this prevent 'recovery by
the broker? In Florida the answer to this problem lies in a consideration of
whether or not the broker was the procuring cause of the sale. To be the pro-
curing cause the broker must show that he called the potential vendee's atten-
tion to the property and that it was through his efforts that the sale was con-
summated. When the purchaser is not introduced by the broker, he must prove
that it was through his continued efforts that a satisfactory arrangement was
concluded. The active negotiations consist not only of a mere introduction of
the parties, hut also a series of propositions and invitations which result in a
sale~A5
30. 35 So.2d 387 (Fla. 1948); Stephenson, Quarterly Synopsis, 3 MIAMI L. Q. 279,
291 (1949).
31. Id. at 391.
32. Waters Realty Co. v. Miami Tripure Water Co., 100 Fla. 221, 129 So. 723 (1930).
33. Acheson v. Smiths Inc., supra.
34. George A. Fuller Co. v. Ford, 63 F.2d 889 (C.C.A. 5th 1933).
35. St. Petersburg Land & Loan Co. v. Shallcross, 84 Fla. 575, 94 So. 502 (1922);
Perper v. Edell, supra (Dun & Bradstreet report admissible evidence to show financial
ability) ; Stewart v. McMurray, 82 Ala. 269, 3 So. 47 (1887).
36. Note, 7 IND. L. J. 389 (1932).
37. Jaeger v. Glover, 89 Minn. 490, 95 N. W. 311 (1903) ; Southwick v. Swavienski,
114 App. Div. 681, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1079 (1906).
38. Wood v. Smith, 162 Mich. 334, 127 N. W. 277 (1910); Note, 27 ILL. L. REv.
436 (1932).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
This doctrine was adopted in Florida in Cumberland Saviog & Trust Co.
v. McGriff. 9 A broker was employed to procure a purchaser of real estate at
a definite price, on a percentage commission basis. The broker introduced to
the owner a prospective purchaser, who took an option and later allowed it to
lapse. The broker continued to discuss the matter with the potential vendee.
Later, after negotiations with the owner, in which the broker took no part,
ihe purchaser bought the property. Applying the procuring cause test, the
court reasoned that the broker, having introduced and continued to interest
the person who eventually did buy, was entitled to his commission. 40 And in
Pensacola Finance Co. v. Simpson,"l the first time the vendor dealt with the
prospective purchaser, the vendor was not aware that the purchaser was sent
by a broker and, accordingly, did not include the broker's commission in the
sale price. Prior to the actual sale, the vendor was advised that the proposed
purchaser had been obtained and sent to him through the efforts of the broker
who claimed a commission for services. The vendor then withdrew the offer
which had been made directly to the purchaser and, by a new transaction, sold
the property to the vendee at the same price. The court allowed the broker to
recover, stating that he was the procuring cause of the sale.
In order to allow recovery in this type situation, the broker must plead
that he was the procuring cause for the consummation of the sale.42 The
Wiggins case further delineates Florida's use of the procuring cause doctrine.
The broker was denied recovery, the court holding that since the purchaser
was not ready, willing and able when procured, when at a later date the ven-
dor sold the property to the same purchaser, the broker could have no claims,
since he was not the procuring cause of the sale.
The procuring cause test is also applied to those instances where the
final contract or transaction negotiated is different from that specifically
stipulated in the broker's contract of employment. In Taylor v. Dorsey,43 the
court allowed the brokerage commission although the sale was consummated
at a price less than the amount designated by the vendor at the time of the
listing, the broker's continued activity being considered the procuring cause
of the sale. However, if the brokerage contract expressly calls for the nego-
tiation of a sale at a fixed price, and no other, the consummation of the sale
on any other terms precludes the broker from recovering. 44 This doctrine has
been followed in almost all cases, since the procuring cause test is based on
39. 61 Fla. 159, 54 So. 265 (1911).
40. Lowe v. Crawford, 97 Fla. 672, 122 So. 11 (1929); Note, 21 TU;.ANE L. Rv.
137 (1946).
41. 82 Fla. 368, 90 So. 381 (1921).
42. Foley-Carter Ins. Co., Inc. v. Commonwealth Life Ins,. Co., 128 F.2d 718
(C. C. A. 5th 1942).
43. 155 Fla. 305, 19 So.2d 876 (1944).
44. Rickmers v. Tuckerman, 80 Fla. 839, 87 So. 53 (1920) ; Varn v. Pelot, supra.
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the theory that some such modification was in the original contemplation of
the parties.
Thus, it may be seen that it is not necessary for the broker to have per-
sonally conducted the negotiations which took place between the vendor and
vendee, or that he was present, or even that the principal should have known
at the time that the purchaser was one found by the broker. All that is neces-
sary is that the broker's efforts were the efficient, procuring or producing
cause of the sale being consummated. Although the broker's efforts might
have been slight, if they brought about the desired results, no more is necessary,
and though his operations might have been indirect, if the purchase was the
natural and proximate result of his endeavor, it is sufficient.
IV
FAILURE OF SALE BECAUSE OF VENDOR-PRINCIPAL
When the brokerage contract calls for the effecting of a sale and the
broker procures a purchaser, but, for one reason or another, the seller de-
faults, the question arises as to whether or not the broker is entitled to his
commissions. To determine if recovery will be allowed, the courts do not apply
the procuring cause test, but only consider if the broker has, or has not, com-
pleted all that his contract of employment calls for. In Hutchins & Co. v. Sher-
ajj~, 4 5 a broker under an effect sale contract, secured a purchaser who was
ready, willing and able to purchase the vendor's property on the required
terms. The purchaser cancelled his offer because of the withdrawal by the ven-
dor of part of the property. As to the broker's recovery of commissions, the
court has held that where a broker has performed and the consummation of the
transaction was prevented because of some fault of the principal, the broker is
entitled to his commission.4U
The extension of the principle of the Hutchins case 4T is exemplified in
the decisions allowing the broker to recover when his commission is to come
frorn the first cash payment, but the transaction is not consummated because
of the vendor's action. 48 If one prevents the happening or performance of a
condition precedent upon which the liability by the terms of the contract is
based, he cannot avail himself of his own wrong and relieve himself of his re-
sponsibility to the broker.49
45. 82 Fla, 167, 89 So. 430 (1921).
46. Perper v. Edell, supra; Davis v. Battle, 132 Fla. 240, 182 So. 243 (1938) (owner
arbitrarily withdrew) ; Livingston v. Malever, supra; Hart v. Pierce, 98 Fla. 1087, 125
So. 243 (1929) (owner paid purchaser to withdraw from transaction).
47. See note 45 supra.
48. See Note, 20 A.L.R. 289 (1922).
49. Waddell v. J. P. Holbrook Co.. 108 Fla. 332, 147 So. 213 (1933) (broker may
recover commission which was to come from the first cash payment, but only earnest
money had been paid, when vendor withdrew); Walker v. Chancery, 96 Fla. 82, 117
So. 705 (1928) (commission to come from first cash payment. but vendor withdrew after
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If the transaction is not consummated because of a defect in the vendor's
title, " or for other faults of the vendor,51 recovery for the broker will be
granted provided he had no knowledge of the defect.
V
THE FDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP
One condition that must be fulfilled in all cases before the broker is en-
titled to compensation, regardless of the fact that he has completed all that his
contract of employment requires, is that he in no way has breached his fiduciary
duty toward his principal.5 2 This principle was announced in the Wiggins
case where the broker claimed that he had procured the purchaser to whom
the vendor had sold the property. The vendor disclaimed any liability and
maintained that the broker had been guilty of a breach of his fiduciary duty.
In holding for the vendor the court said, "If they knew or thought that this
alleged customer of theirs had the ability and was ready and willing to purchase
the property at the price and on the terms that they were authorized to sell,
it was their duty to promptly notify their principal of such fact. Then, after re-
ceiving such notice, if the principal sold to such customer at a less price and on
different terms than those given to the brokers, they would be entitled to their
commissions. But if the brokers knew of the customer's ability, readiness, and
willingness to take the property at the price and on the terms named in their
contract of employment, and withheld such knowledge from their principal, it
amounted to bad faith with their principal, which forfeits their rights to any
commissions out of a sale effected by the principal in ignorance of such facts." 5-1
In Carter v. Owners,54 a broker had a net listing on the vendor's property. A
purchaser was found who was willing to buy at the vendor's price, but the
broker withheld the information from the vendor and tried to induce the vendor
to lower his selling price so as to increase his commission. Upon refusal of the
vendor to lower his price, the broker persuaded the purchaser to buy the
property at the first offered price. In denying the broker's commission the
court held that a real estate broker is bound to disclose to his principal any
material facts known to him, and, if the broker takes part in the negotiation, he
is bound to exert all his skill for the benefit of his principal. Any concealment
being offered a higher price. Held, broker may recover) ; Note, 18 MINN. L. RUy. 587
(1934).
50. Knowles v. Henderson, 156 Fla. 31, 22 So.2d 384 (1945) (vendor only owned
one-half interest in land) ; Notes, 43 CoL L. REv. 108 (1943), 30 COL. L. REv. 255 (1930) ;
R. J. & B.- F. Camp Lumber Co. v. Tedder, 78 Fla. 183, 82 So. 865 (1919) (portion
of vendor's title not marketable).
51. Sullivan v. Brown, supra (deficiency in amount of land which vendor offered for
sale).
52. MECHEM, AGENCY § 643 (1923).
53. Wiggins v. Wilson, 55 Fla. 346, 356, 45 So. 10ll, 1014 (1908).
54. 58 Fla. 204, 50 So. 641 (1909).
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from the principal of material facts, or any collusion by him with the pur-
chaser, will preclude the right of the agent to compensation for his services. 55
The same will hold true if the broker is representing both purchaser and ven-
dor, unless such dual agency has the consent of both parties.56 Many times,
however, the broker is acting as a middleman, and may collect compensation
from both the vendor and vendee. :27
CONCLUSION
The writer has endeavored to depict the pattern followed by the courts,
particularly in Florida, where the question of real estate brokerage commissions
is presented. The principles announced in the leading case of Wiggins v. Wil-
son illustrate the type of approach used by the courts in dealing with such a
question, namely (I) a careful examination of the brokerage contract to de-
termine the type of employment and scope of the undertaking; (2) a determi-
nation of whether or not the broker was the procuring cause of the sale, if the
sale was not consummated on the terms authorized; (3) a determination of
whether any breach of a fiduciary relationship has occurred.
It has been stated previously, with. regard to oral contracts of employ-
ment, that considerable litigation could be avoided by legislative enactment.
Pending such legislation, it is submitted that the following suggestions will
serve to eliminate pitfalls that might well lead to litigation. First, as many of
the details of the brokerage contract as practically feasible should be reduced
to writing. Next, if the contract is one granting to the broker exclusive rights,
use of the teriS"exclusive sale" should be avoided, for it may be interpreted
to mean either an "exclusive agency" or an "exclusive right to sell"-with dif-
ferent consequences regarding the principal's liability. Next, a clear distinction
should be made as to whether the broker, before becoming entitled to his com-
mission, must only procure a purchaser or actually effect a sale. Finally, the
amount of the commission should be stated in certain terms.
HARRY B. SMITH
55. Skinner Mfg. Co. v. Douville, 57 Fla. 180, 49 So. 125 (1909) ; Van Woy v.
Willis, 153 Fla. 189, 14 So.2d 185 (1943) ; Note, 34 CALIF. L. REv. 772 (1946).
56. Burnham City Lumber Co. v. Rannie, 59 Fla. 179, 59 So. 617 (1910); Red
Cypress Lumber Co. v. Perry, 118 Ga. 876, 54 S. E. 674 (1903) ; Zichlin v. Dill, 157 Fla.
96,25 So.2d 4 (1946) ; MEcIEM, AGENCY § 644 (1923) ; See Note, 80 A.L.R. 1075 (1932).
57. Grossman v. Herman, 266 N. Y. 249, 194 N. E. 694, 695 (1935).
